It’s common knowledge that Islamic terrorists have been indoctrinated with the mentality that killing certain groups of innocent people is a good thing, and many have been taught this from as early as they can remember.
However, over time, many have come to the realization that what they were doing was objectively (true apart from human opinion) morally wrong. How could they arrive at this conclusion if this is how they were indoctrinated from their earliest years of childhood?
Their society and religion–at least a logically consistent form of it based on portions of the Quran, Muhammad’s teachings, and the Hadith–have taught them that it is honorable to murder for their god, Allah. In doing so, it ensures a possible entrance into paradise upon their death.
Still, many of these Muslims who have escaped this community and deconverted, will tell you that they innately knew their actions were morally evil despite being brainwashed to the contrary.
Many theistic ethicists, theologians and biblical scholars would say the reason they felt this way, is because these individuals have been made in the image of God. They have a conscience that has God’s moral law imprinted upon their hearts, and they were violating the universal divine commands that God has prescribed, such as, thou shalt love your neighbor, rather than murder them.
A modified Divine Command Theory of Ethics (DCT) provides the adequate grounding source for objective moral duties (I will use duties and obligations interchangeably). I say modified because the old DCT theories taught that God was so powerful that if he wanted to command us to hate him or murder someone, then he could do it.
In a modified DCT, moral values are objective because they are grounded in the very nature of God who is the Ultimate Good. As for our moral duties, they are objective and prescriptively binding because they are grounded in God’s commands reflecting his perfect moral nature.
It may sound strange, but some things may be the right thing to do even though it’s not something morally good. For example, having to end a life justifiably in an act of war to prevent greater moral atrocities. Killing is bad, but sometimes it’s the right thing to do under the right conditions.
Philosophers David Baggett and Jerry Walls note,
“God’s commands determine what’s morally obligatory, but not what’s morally good.”[1]
So, God can’t just randomly determine that murder is a good thing for us to do because his commands are identical with his perfect and unchangeable moral character which is Goodness itself.
For a better understanding of how goodness is grounded in God’s nature and rightness is grounded in God’s commands, check out my brief article on the Euthyphro Dilemma here.
We’ll get to why DCT is a good moral theory that explains moral obligations, but first, let me quickly summarize why the other ethical theories fail to adequately explain authoritative objective moral duties.
Do We Have Moral Duties if God Doesn’t Exist?
What about a world where God doesn’t exist? On Naturalism—which says nature is all that exists—it’s hard to imagine that objective moral values and duties exist. Many non-theistic philosophers think we could still have them, but there are many who think we could not.
Regardless, it is commonly understood that a world without God makes it very difficult to explain how they could exist. I mean, why should I be morally obligated to comply with someone else’s opinions or beliefs?
Especially if these beliefs are the byproduct of evolved cerebral matter determined by the laws of physics, and nothing more than neurochemicals randomly reacting in different ways within different people.
Philosopher George Mavrodes thinks it is odd that objective moral values and obligations exist within a naturalistic framework. Mavrodes employs Bertrand Russell’s philosophical interpretation of the world, in that human cognitive faculties are nothing more than a collocation of atoms; hence, there is no afterlife–only the future heat death of the universe.[2]
Mavrodes refers to this naturalistic (nature is all there is) interpretation as a “Russellian world” and that it fails to provide objective moral duties. Moreover, the moral duties that we do observe are not always beneficial to the one performing them.
For instance, some people will end up having to sacrifice their lives or material possessions that bring them comfort in order to make someone else’s circumstance better; so, Mavrodes says it is queer to impose moral obligations upon others. These moral obligations do not provide Russellian benefits (desired states of self-interest), rather, they are counterproductive to their well-being.
There are many atheists who would agree that we do not have objective moral values and duties in a naturalistic world, some of which are: Bertrand Russell, Friedrich Nietzsche, Jean-Paul Sartre, J. L. Mackie, Michael Ruse, and Richard Dawkins.
Atheistic Moral Frameworks Can’t Produce Objective Moral Duties
There are different ways that non-theistic philosophers who are moral realists–those who believe morality objectively exists–try explaining how moral values and duties could be real and what their grounding source is. One way is for naturalists to take an evolutionary approach to ethics, claiming that morality is grounded in emotions or social contracts.
Baggett and Walls explain that some defenders of this view lack the ability to provide adequate grounding and explanatory power and scope for objective morality. These naturalists often appeal to social behavior and practices which doesn’t explain the ontological nature of the moral truths they’re attempting to describe; rather, they explain descriptions of behavior while not accounting for the prescriptions.[3] Just because someone feels obligated to do something, it doesn’t mean there is an actual obligation that is morally objective.
There are also problems concerning the ability to understand how our cognitive faculties could track and recognize these moral truths. That’s because evolutionary naturalism shows that we have evolved to develop beliefs aimed at survival rather than what is morally true.[4]
Then, you have philosophers taking a non-naturalist approach, suggesting that our moral values and duties are grounded in abstract objects, the existence of which are simply necessary truths (necessity de re), and can be classified as brute facts (facts that cannot be explained). This particular moral theory is a form of Platonism.
There’s a major problem with this idea, though, which is: these abstract objects are causally inert, meaning they do not stand in cause-and-effect relationships and thus have no way of interacting with our actions. It is extremely implausible to think these objects could somehow produce moral obligations for us to recognize and comply with.
In a debate between Christian Philosopher William Lane Craig and atheist philosopher Eric Wielenberg on the objectivity of moral values and duties, Craig explains that even if Moral Platonism were true, it faces major objections regarding how these abstract objects (goodness/badness) can attach themselves to physical situations.
They are non-agents, so it is far-fetched to suggest they can somehow select the correct actions to assign the appropriate value to. Wielenberg claims physical objects cause abstract objects to supervene on physical situations. How can a physical and concrete object somehow reach out to causally connect to some transcended isolated abstract object?[5]
Some of these normative realists would say, “when you see X, then you have a reason to act on X,” whereas Christianity says, “you already have an obligation to do X, and that is why you act on X.”
Obligations therefore give us our reasons to act in certain settings, rather than experiencing an event which then obligates us to some action. To say that I already have a duty to help someone in need, is equivalent to saying that I have an overriding and authoritative reason for doing so, which on naturalism is extremely difficult to explain. Baggett and Walls note,
“If the determinists are right, we couldn’t have done differently, ever. And if we do behave in accord with morality, it is because of physiological causes in our brain, not because of the persuasive power of abstract entities.”[6]
The challenge for non-natural ethicists, is to account for a universal experience of objective, prescriptively binding and authoritative moral obligations.
Okay, so we’ve covered some non-theistic moral realist theories on how to explain objective moral values and duties. But what about those who don’t believe that morality objectively exists, and yet still claim that we have moral duties?
These non-cognitivists–those who are not moral realists and believe that there are no objective moral values or duties–will often argue that we have evolved to build societies that support human flourishing, and we just know that it is good to help others because you would want to be helped. Some of these proponents assert that moral obligations arise from the emotions of others, and that only our feelings guide us on how we ought to behave. Yikes.
So, if someone told you they feel like you shouldn’t cheat on your exam, they would merely be expressing their subjective (personal) opinion and disapproval of your activity, but there wouldn’t be anything objectively wrong about it.
What if cheating on my exam allows me to get into a good college and make more money to take better care of myself and my family? Why should I care about how someone else feels? If what I am doing is going to benefit myself, even if it prevents someone else from having a chance at a better career, then I am going to do just that.
The non-cognitivist view of moral duties is majorly lacking authority. This view is deceiving because it gives the impression of objective truth, when in reality they are pseudo-truths designed to give the appearance of something true independent of what humans feel or think.
Another view is called Ethical relativism (constructivism) which is based on a social contract theory of ethics. However, social contracts are something that cannot be agreed upon by all groups. Even if a generalized moral framework of ethics was created, you would still have a large number of people disagreeing.
Imagine ordering a pizza with toppings that were voted “the best” by thousands of people–you would still have thousands of others wanting a different type! This is even more true on significant issues involving how we ought to behave or live.
And even if we could determine such a moral ideal, it would lack the ability to obligate people to comply with it. These moral obligations would have to be grounded in agreements made by social groups, however, due to the various social beliefs, customs, values and principles, it would be impossible to ground obligations in these agreements.
So, there would have to be multiple moral frameworks developed by multiple social groups in various parts of society and the world. This means they are not objective or universal and lack the proper authority to produce moral obligations.
Notable philosopher C. Stephen Evans notes the absurdity of the social contract theory by referencing Princeton philosopher Gilbert Harman. Harman gave a thought experiment where he says to imagine a professional “Murder Company” that employs assassins to kill people. In this concrete social group who have created their own moral framework, there has been an agreement made that permits such activity.
Therefore, the assassin ought to kill his victim and there is nothing objectively wrong with this. In fact, he could be praised for doing such a good job! He says the only reason why someone might object, is because this idea opposes our moral language derived from our Western moral values and ethical theories.
As you can see, this gives us a good idea of what a moral framework can look like when it lacks the proper authority that can provide a universal divine command which obligates mankind in the way that it should, such as, “thou shall not murder.”
This moral authority provides a way for us to say something ought not to be done, despite what others believe or have constructed for their moral framework, such as Murder Inc.[7] And remember, just because someone accepts a social contract, it doesn’t mean that they can’t decide to break that contract.
Divine Command Theory Best Explains Moral Obligations
A proper DCT best explains objective moral obligations, and Evans has shown that it’s even compatible and complementary to Natural Law and Virtue Ethics. For more on this, check out his book God & Moral Obligation.
He also reminds us that on a Judeo-Christian moral framework, moral obligations carry a law conception of ethics due to the Law that was given in the Old Testament by God. It makes sense to think that a Divine Lawgiver who possesses the proper authority would prescribe commands that, if disobeyed, would make someone morally blameworthy.[8]
Evans, like the renowned philosopher Robert Adams, believes the easiest way to understand how moral obligations could have a grounding source or foundation, is to understand them as being divine requirements such as commands.[9]
For example, “Thou Shall Not Murder” is a general command to all of humanity and one that is universally grasped by everyone. These general moral obligations aren’t mere suggestions on how someone should act, rather they are commands that one is obligated to perform without consideration, even if they don’t feel them.
For example, a sociopath who lacks empathy may not feel like helping a baby girl that is struggling to get out of a half-filled bucket of water she just fell in, but that person is still obligated to save that baby. Period.
You may wonder, “how does God reveal these divine commands to us?” His commands are broadcasted to us in several different ways, such as, special revelation from Scripture; learning from others who have received God’s requirements and passing them down through religious teachings; and our conscience because his moral law is written on our hearts (Romans 2:15).[10]
Some may object and say that people who don’t believe in God will not recognize God as the one issuing the commands, and therefore will not be liable for not obeying the commands. This objection doesn’t hold. As Robert Adams notes,
“Using signs that one knows no one could understand as a command to do a does not count as commanding anyone to do a. So if an omniscient being issues commands, it must be by signs that could be understood by the intended audience, or a significant part of it, as the intended commands.”[11]
Philosopher Matthew Flannagan provides an excellent illustration to demonstrate that all humans, no matter their beliefs, are still held liable for violating the commands of God and have a duty to obey them because they can still recognize the authority behind the commands regardless of knowing their source.
He says to imagine that you are walking down a public path and you come across a sign that says, “private property, do not enter, trespassers will be prosecuted.” In this situation you’re able to recognize the authoritative nature of the sign and that the owner has posted it, even though you don’t know who the owner is, and it’s obvious that you are obligated to comply with this command. He says a person doesn’t need to know who the author of the command is, in order to properly recognize it and the authority behind it.[12]
We all recognize God’s general divine commands, and we are guilty of violating them. The situations in which we are most aware of our moral obligations, are the same ones that we strongly desire to do what is not morally permitted. Some people may ignore moral obligations or doubt their reality in certain situations in order to justify their wrongful actions, thereby minimizing or dissolving the feeling of guilt associated with that wrongful act.
For example, suppose there is a man named, Jim, who is a disgruntled employee due to a lack of compensation over the years that he truly believes he deserves. From time to time, Jim steals a few office supplies and takes naps in his cubicle, justifying what he’s doing because of his lack of pay while ignoring the slight feeling of wrongness associated with his actions.
One day, after Jim gets home from work, he finds out that his teenage son stole the money he’d been saving for his upcoming big fishing trip. Suddenly Jim becomes acutely aware of the reality and objectivity of moral obligations as this sense of moral wrongness forcefully emerges within him.
The “Principle of Credulity” that Richard Swinburne defends can be used for affirming the objectivity of moral duties which suggests that “one is justified in believing that what seems to one to be present actually is present, unless some appropriate defeater is operative.”[13]
Evans explains that if our experience of the external world as an objective reality gives us reason to believe it is an objective reality, then we have no reason to treat our experience of morality differently than we treat our perceptual experience of the physical world, even though someone could argue the physical world cannot be proven to exist.[14]
Distinguished philosopher William Sorley maintained a similar view. By the way, if you’re trying to convince someone that the external world is a reality and that you (Christian) exist, then you should probably just move on. Being skeptical is one thing, but cynical individuals are disingenuous and most likely trying to waste your time!
In the absence of defeaters, prima facie (at first glance) justification is reasonable. It’s reasonable to trust the reliability, not infallibility, of our human cognitive faculties concerning the external world; and although there are some skeptical philosophers who say we don’t have good reasons to believe in the external world, they still live as if they believe in the reality of that external world.[15] Likewise, we can trust our moral reasoning and be justified in believing that objective moral values and duties exist.
Why Should I Obey God’s Commands?
Some philosophers criticize and misinterpret DCT by suggesting it infantilizes adults and requires that we need someone to micromanage our lives. Craig Boyd and Don Thorsen seem to think this when writing, “Obedience is a virtue usually reserved for the young and immature. It is insulting to be told by someone else, ‘Because I said so,’ when you are no longer a child.”[16]
I believe they have either mischaracterized the view or haven’t seen the modified versions offered by contemporary philosophers.
Their concern would be legitimate if God told us what to wear each day, when to eat, where to sleep, how we should act in every given situation, etc. But instead, God gives general commands backed with authority for universal issues for human flourishing, such as, “Love your neighbor as yourself.”
Also, it could be argued that many adults do act like children and need moral guidance by a superior, infinite, all-knowing Being who wants what is best for us. DCT also provides those who haven’t heard of God with an avenue to reason to him as the its source and thus, recognize his existence despite his “hiddenness.”
Baggett and Walls rightly remind us that morality requires an additional vital component–authority. Authority helps us better understand why we must do something and if we don’t, one result of that failure is the experience of guilt. This is a real moral condition and not just a subjective feeling, because actual guilt is not the same as the feeling of guilt (although a feeling can make us aware of the presence of actual guilt).
For example, a soccer mom can feel guilty for not being able to volunteer to help with her daughter’s soccer team this season (she made no prior commitments) due to additional work responsibilities, but this mom has not violated some transcendent law that obligated her to help out.
On the contrary, if a psychopath kills someone and doesn’t feel guilt, it in no way implies that he is not actually guilty for his crimes; therefore, guilt and the feeling of guilt are completely distinct from each other.[17] This makes sense with a biblical view of God who has provided commands that, when broken, can produce guilt which means we are in need of grace and forgiveness.
Moreover, not all of God’s commands are meant to obligate us to perform all duties in the same manner. We should help the poor, but we are not obligated to give them everything we possess at all times in all instances.
God’s authority can issue commands to particular people at specific times, turning an imperfect duty into a strong concrete prescription for someone. Although God guides us in personal ways, it does not entail that every obligation that he imposes applies equally to everyone in a similar set of circumstances.[18]
Finally, it seems fitting to desire to comply with the commands of an Almighty being in whom we owe our very existence, all of our possessions, and every good thing we have since he is the source of everything good. He blesses us on a daily basis, and we don’t even deserve the things he’s given to us.
God loves us more than we can comprehend, and we can trust his character regardless of the perception we have toward the dilemma we’re faced with. Many people want to please him and obey his commands, even the difficult ones, because of who he is and what he’s done for us.
So, a proper view of DCT connects to the omnibenevolence of God concerning objective moral values and duties, and it provides an adequate grounding source with the authority needed to prescribe general and binding commands to humanity. Some notable proponents of DCT, or some form of it, include: Augustine, Duns Scotus, Robert Adams, John Hare, Philip Quinn, C. Stephen Evans, David Baggett, William Lane Craig, Paul Copan, Jerry Walls and Matthew Flannigan.
Blessings,
Andrew Drinkard
[1] David Baggett and Jerry L. Walls, Good God: The Theistic Foundations of Morality (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 47.
[2] George I. Mavrodes, ‘‘Religion and the Queerness of Morality,’’ in Rationality, Religious Belief and Moral Commitment: Essays in the Philosophy of Religion, edited by Robert Audi and William J. Wainwright, 580. file:///C:/Users/ADRINK~1/AppData/Local/Temp/Mavrodes%20Religion%20and%20the%20Queerness%20of%20Morality.pdf.
[3] David Baggett and Jerry L. Walls, God and Cosmos: Moral Truth and Human Meaning (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 156.
[4] Alvin Plantinga, Where the Conflict Really Lies: Science, Religion, and Naturalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 137-154.
[5] William Lane Craig and Eric Wielenberg, “God and Morality,” Reasonable Faith, February 23, 2018, accessed September 12, 2020, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xHhmuqBW6Dw&t=6840s.
[6] Baggett and Walls, Good God, 24.
[7] C. Stephen Evans, God & Moral Obligation (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 132.
[8] Evans, God & Moral Obligation, 30.
[9] Ibid, 26.
[10] Ibid, 32.
[11] Robert Merrihew Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods: A Framework for Ethics (Oxford University Press, Incorporated, 2002), 269.
[12] Matthew Flannagan, “The Psychopath Objection to Divine Command Theory: Another Response to Erik Wielenberg,” Presentation to the New Zealand Association of Philosophers, 2019. https://www.academia.edu/41270300/The_Psychopath_Objection_to_Divine_Command_Theory_Another_Response_to_Erik_Wielenberg?email_work_card=view-paper.
[13] Mark Webb, “Religious Experience”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/religious-experience.
[14] Evans, God & Moral Obligation, 162.
[15] Ibid, 161-165.
[16] Craig A. Boyd and Don Thorsen, Christian Ethics and Moral Philosophy: An Introduction to Issues and Approaches (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2018), 65.
[17] David Baggett and Jerry L. Walls, God and Cosmos: Moral Truth and Human Meaning (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 150.
[18] Baggett and Walls, Good God, 128.
